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CONSUMERS-R-US: A REALITY IN THE U.C.C.
ARTICLE 2 REVISION PROCESS
YVONNE W. RosmARW*
I. INTRODUCTION
After setting forth several approaches to addressing consumer
issues in the revision of U.C.C. Article 2, Professor Miller's arti-
cle recommends a "principled approach."' Those with an inti-
mate knowledge of how the U.C.C. affects consumers on a daily
basis (i.e., those who practice consumer law and represent con-
sumers) must be included in the process of revision, as Professor
Miller points out.2 This Article, on the other hand, is concerned
more with the end result than with the exact approach used to
reach it. Inclusion in the revision process is not sufficient if the
end result does not reflect the realities of how consumer transac-
tions vary from commercial ones and how the U.C.C. shapes and
controls those transactions. While -consumer advocates may
disagree with some of Professor Miller's theory, they would prob-
ably agree with most of his suggested changes to Article 2, in-
cluding his call for consumer provisions that are different from
those applicable to commercial transactions. This Article will
build upon Professor Miller's contentions and will set forth some
minimum guidelines for reaching an end result that should
allow consumer representatives and practitioners to support the
revisions when they reach the state legislatures for enactment.
While a uniform Article 2 is the goal of all parties concerned,
uniformity, however much desired, will not be attained unless
the revised Article 2 is fair to consumers. The revision must deal
* B.A., Ohio State University, 1972; J.D., Syracuse University College of Law,
1976. Ms. Rosmarin is an attorney with the National Consumer Law Center and an
official Observer to the Article 2 Drafting Committee. The positions expressed herein
do not necessarily represent the views of the National Consumer Law Center.
1. Fred H. Miller, Consumer Issues and the Revision of U.C.C. Article 2, 35 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1565, 1571 (1994). Keep in mind, however, that Article 2 is not the
only article of the Uniform Commercial Code that affects consumers. Articles 3 and
4, already revised and being enacted, and Article 9, which currently is being revised,
substantially affect consumers.
2. Id. at 1570-71, 1573 n.33.
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satisfactorily with the problems that have become apparent over
the years in the area of consumer transactions under the Code.
Some would see consumers as a "special interest" group, like a
manufacturers' association or purchasers' organization, but this
view misses the point. Consumer transactions are not those of a
special interest group, they are merely a subset of commercial
transactions, which involve a commercial party on one side and
an individual on the other. To characterize attempts to craft fair
rules for those transactions as catering to "special interests"
loses sight of the fact that every individual is a consumer and
needs to purchase goods. Because no single person is an expert
in all areas of goods, everyone is "unsophisticated" (as compared
with merchants and commercial parties) in some transactions.
Some provisions and comments of the current Article 2 reflect
a policy that consumers (and sometimes all nonmerchants) are
to be judged by different standards than commercial parties (or
merchants).' Two sections directly set forth different rules for
consumer transactions." The courts have modified other provi-
sions of Article 2 to address the lack of consumer rules. Based
on the general underlying policies of the U.C.C., such as liberal
construction5 and the intent of the parties being paramount to
the written document,6 some courts have used the U.C.C.'s im-
precise language to interpret different standards for consumers
and to recognize that consumer and commercial transactions are
different.' With the revision of Article 2, the treatment of con-
sumer transactions no longer should be left to general policy and
3. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-608 cmt. 5 (1990) ("Following the general policy of this
Article, the requirements [of notice of revocation of acceptance] . . . are less strin-
gent in the case of a non-merchant buyer."); id. § 2-607 cmt. 4 ("[A] retail consumer
is to be judged by different standards [regarding time for notice and content
thereofi . . . ."); id. § 2-318 (addressing third-party beneficiaries of warranties and
providing alternatives for different rules to cover consumer transactions); id § 2-
719(3) ("Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of
consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the
loss is commercial is not.").
4. Id. §§ 2-318, 2-719(3).
5. Id. § 1-102(1).
6. Id. §§ 1-201(11), 1-201(3), 1-201 cmt. 3, 1-205 cmt. 1.
7. See, e.g., YVONNE W. ROSMARIN & JONATHAN SHELDON, NATIONAL CONSUMIER
LAW CTR., SALES OF GOODS AND SERVICES §§ 9.3.2, 27.2.2.2, 30.3.2, 30.5.1 (2d ed.
1989 & Supp. 1993).
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the vagaries of court interpretations with the resulting lack of
uniformity for both consumer and commercial transactions. Now
is the time to acknowledge the reality that today's commercial
world includes an enormous number of consumer transactions
for the sale of goods.' The revised Article 2 needs to address
this troublesome area directly.
II. CONSUMER GOALS IN REVISING ARTICLE 2
The goal of consumer representatives in revising Article 2 to
deal with the special problems of transactions involving individ-
ual consumers and commercial parties is neither to turn the
Code into a "regulatory" statute nor to "enhance consumer
protections" to an ideal state. Rather, their purpose is to achieve
fair treatment in all transactions, including consumer transac-
tions, which comprise a large portion of all commercial transac-
tions and which now finally have been recognized as significant
both politically as well as economically. Article 2's basic assump-
tions of negotiability of contract, freedom of contract, and a level
playing field are based on the commercial transaction model
and, for the most part, the assumptions are valid in this scenar-
io. Because not all transactions fit these original assumptions,
however, the U.C.C. needs different rules and assumptions for
consumer transactions. The Code's general policy of promoting
fairness makes it imperative to include special provisions deal-
ing with consumer transactions for the Code to be fair to all
parties.' Since the revision effort is to update the law and look
8. The author knows of no reported statistics on the subject, but it appears pa-
tently obvious that consumer transactions for the sale of goods greatly outnumber
purely commercial transactions.
9. Two of the current U.C.C. provisions addressing the issue of fairness, U.C.C.
§§ 1-203, 2-302 (1990), are insufficient in consumer transactions. Section 1-203 im-
poses an obligation of good faith, but has failed, mostly as a result of unequal bar-
gaining power, to prevent use of adhesion contracts in most consumer transactions
involving a written contract. Instead, sellers use the Code's latitude to the maximum
extent possible in the name of "freedom of contract." Section 2-302, allowing the
invalidation of an unconscionable contract or contract provision, similarly has failed
to ensure fairness in consumer transactions as unfairness alone may not rise to the
required level of unconscionability. Id. § 2-302 cmt. 1 ("The principle is one of the
prevention of oppression and unfair suprise and not of disturbance of allocation of
risks because of superior bargaining power.") (citation omitted).
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forward to the future needs of commerce, inclusion of such recog-
nition in the new language of the statute itself obviously seems
warranted.
No matter what the consumer's level of sophistication, when
dealing with a commercial party the playing field in the ordi-
nary consumer transaction is never level. As Professor Miller
points out, the commercial party usually prepares the contract
and other documentation with nonnegotiable terms.'0 These
"adhesion" contracts are presented on a "take it or leave it" basis
and the consumer cannot vary the terms of the standard form
contract. The seller, as the commercial party, has all the eco-
nomic power on its side. If the consumer buyer wants the goods,
she will have to buy from either this seller, offering an adhesion
contract, or another, offering a slightly different, but similar,
adhesion contract. In such situations, the notion of "freedom of
contract" means that the commercial party, with its economic
advantage, is free to do whatever the Code allows it to do.
Therefore, the Code should provide limits to its policy of "free-
dom of contract" in consumer transactions.
With the broad concept of fairness" as the basic premise of
Article 2, the kinds of provisions that consumers need in revised
Article 2 echo certain themes. Preservation of the reasonable
10. Miller, supra note 1, at 1565.
11. The Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) criteria for promulgation of a rule
against unfairness, cited by Professor Miller, Miller, supra note 1, at 1569 n.14, are
inappropriate as criteria for acceptance of consumer provisions in Article 2. These
criteria, that the consumer injury outweigh the benefits of the practice and that
there be a violation of an established public policy, are inapplicable to a U.C.C.
analysis. The FTC uses these criteria as the basis for implementing affirmative con-
sumer protection rules that are meant to eliminate, prevent, or regulate certain com-
mercial practices that may be otherwise legal. See JONATHAN SHELDON, NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CTR., UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 4.3 (3d ed.
1991 & Supp. 1993).
The U.C.C. itself is the legal basis for the rules and system that it creates. No
special requirements need be met before acknowledging the need for different rules
for consumers in certain sections of the Code. One need only recognize how consum-
er transactions differ from commercial ones. This recognition merely goes back to the
basics of what the U.C.C. is supposed to be: a codification of rules for sales transac-
tions. The fact that the underlying assumptions upon which the current Article 2 is
based do not adequately serve in the area of consumer transactions, the realities of
modern commerce, and the Code's notion of fairness are sufficient "criteria" for
changing the Code.
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expectations of the consumer is one of the major themes. The
use of commercial language that the U.C.C. sanctions but that
consumers do not commonly understand 2 and merger clauses
that attempt to disavow oral statements made to the consumer
exemplify practices that Article 2 currently allows but that can
defeat the consumer's reasonable expectations.
Several corollaries follow from the notion that consumers'
expectations should be preserved. A seller should not be able to
use boilerplate language that would defeat those expectations,
whether the expectations arise from express oral warranties or
from a belief that remedies are available for breach of warranty.
Requiring language to be conspicuous in a consumer transac-
tion 3 does not necessarily make it fair. Requiring that a con-
tract term be signed or initialed separately or that it be conspic-
uous cannot assure that the party signing or initialing fully
understands the meaning and consequence of the term. In many
cases, a giant "AS IS" statement or a disclaimer clause in bold
face and all capital letters disclaiming the implied warranty of
merchantability and any other implied warranties may be unfair
no matter how large or bold the words are. Consumers may not
notice even a conspicuous or separately signed clause where, as
in most cases involving a written contract or agreement, they
are told to "just sign by the Xs" and have no opportunity to read
the document.'4
12. For example, the U.C.C. permits the use of the term "as is" to disclaim all
implied warranties, U.C.C. §2-316(3)(a) (1990), however, many consumers fail to
appreciate the significance of the term. See BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION,
FEDERAL TRADE COMMIN, SALE OF USED MOTOR VEHICLES: FINAL STAFF REPORT TO
THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND PROPOSED TRADE REGULATION RULE (16 C.F.R.
PART 455), at 262-66 (1978) (discussing consumers' lack of understanding of the term
"as is" in used car sales); see also 16 C.F.R. § 455.2 (1993) (requiring car dealers to
place on all vehicles the type of warranty available, and where the sale is to be "as
is" to state that the term "as is" means that there are no warranties and the buyer
must pay for all repairs).
13. See U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1990) (allowing disclaimers of the implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose only when the Written disclaim-
er is conspicuous).
14. The reader who has not personally experienced this uncomfortable situation
already is encouraged to try reading any installment purchase contract, car rental
agreement, or even hotel room agreement before signing and to observe the reaction
of the other party.
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In fact, requiring the disclosure of contract terms alone is
insufficient to produce fair terms. This lesson can be drawn from
the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.'5 The purpose of the
Magnuson-Moss Act was to encourage sellers and manufacturers
to provide consumers with better warranties on their prod-
ucts. 6 Covering a portion of the subject matter of Article 2, this
federal statute was intended to encourage better products and
better consumer warranties 7 largely through a series of dis-
closure provisions." Substantively, the Act sets out federal
"minimum" standards for certain warranties. 9 A warranty
meeting those standards is considered a "full" warranty. ° As a
result, most written warranties now provided are "limited," with
the least substantive requirements under the Act.2' Not only
are full warranties rare, but manufacturers generally use their
"limited" Magnuson-Moss "written" warranties to limit the dura-
tion of implied warranties, as the Act permits.22
15. 15 U.S.C. § 2301-2312 (1988).
16. Id. § 2302(a).
17. Federal Trade Commission, Rules Including a Statement of Basis and Purpose
Under Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Disclosure of Written Consumer Product War-
ranty Terms and Conditions and Pre-Sale Availability of Written Warranty Terms,
Dec. 31, 1975.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2303, 2305, 2306, 2308 (1988).
19. Id. § 2304.
20. Id. § 2303(a)(i).
21. Id. § 2302(a)(2). Full warranties most commonly are found on small, inexpen-
sive items with no movable working parts. These items generally cost more to send
back to the manufacturer than to replace. In this situation, the manufacturer gener-
ally can be sure that it will not have many, if any, warranty claims to honor.
22. Section 108(a) of the Act prevents the disclaimer or modification of implied
warranties where a Magnuson-Moss "written" warranty is given. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a)
(1988). Section 108(b), however, permits limiting implied warranties to the duration
of the "limited" "written" warranty. Id. § 2308(b). Virtually all such warranties con-
tain these limitations.
As Professor David Frisch persuasively argued at one Article 2 Drafting Com-
mittee meeting, limiting the duration of an implied warranty runs counter to the
concept of breach of an implied warranty in the current Article 2. Any breach of the
implied warranty occurs at the time of delivery, even if it is not discovered until
later (unless it is a future performance warranty). U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1990). The
seller's liability for breach of an implied warranty thus arises as of the time of de-
livery. The statute of limitations for bringing a claim based upon such a breach is
four years from when the breach occurs. Id. § 2-725(1)-(2). Therefore, limiting the
"duration" of the warranty to a specified period of time is irrelevant because the
breach theoretically has already occurred, even though it has not yet been discov-
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Another theme necessary to level the playing field between
consumers and commercial parties and to counter the superior
economic power of the commercial seller is the desirability of
reducing the likelihood of litigation. The commercial seller or
manufacturer is more likely to have the resources for litigation,
especially for protracted litigation, than is a consumer, who may
have difficulty even in finding an attorney both willing to repre-
sent him on a relatively small claim and experienced in the
fields of consumer law and the Code. This consumer disadvan-
tage makes bright line tests, rather than provisions necessitat-
ing a court's interpretation, especially important in small dollar
transactions, such as consumer transactions. Such bright line
tests would eliminate the need for much litigation and make
summary judgments and settlements more likely in whatever
litigation does result.
The standards that the revised Article 2 provides for consum-
er transactions should be nonwaivable. Article 2 essentially
contains the default provisions for contracts. Because consumer
contracts are seldom, if ever, negotiated, they almost always use
these default terms (unless the commercial party's standard
form contract contains provisions even more favorable to the
commercial party). In fact, virtually all standard form consumer
contracts contain as many waivers, disclaimers, merger clauses,
and other limitations as Article 2 currently allows. Perhaps
these form contracts are just the result of drafting by transac-
tion attorneys. But the reality of consumer transactions is that
any limitations permitted will be used widely by commercial
sellers against consumers.
ered. Section 108(b) of the Magnuson-Moss Act does not address the statute of limi-
tations for bringing the claim of breach.
Limiting the duration of the warranty, as permitted by the Act, would comport
better with a statute of limitations by which accrual of the cause of action occurs
upon discovery of the breach. Section 108(b) then could be viewed as permitting the
warrantor to place an outside limit on the time during which a cause of action could
accrue, and the buyer would have to discover the breach within that period of time.
Professor Miller also proposes a statute of limitations based on a discovery rule.
Miller, supra note 1, at 1582-83.
Section 108(b) would fit Article 2's current statute of limitations scheme if the
implied warranty of limited duration is treated as a future performance warranty,
i.e., that no defect in the goods will occur during the limited time period.
1994] 1599
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III. UNIFORMITY AND THE NEED FOR CONSUMER PROVISIONS
Consumers and commercial entities need uniformity in their
transactions with each other as much as the commercial parties
need uniformity among themselves.2 3 A large number of con-
sumer sales involve manufacturers or sellers who do business
nationwide. National advertisements tout the products on televi-
sion and radio, and in magazines and newspapers. Since the
U.C.C. was first drafted, the nature of the nation's economy has
changed dramatically. Mass marketing, mass distribution, and
mass contracting have shifted the nature of sales transactions
away from the classic two-party contract paradigm. The typical
consumer transaction is no longer a local one with a local mer-
chant or supplier.
Even the concept of consumer protection is much the same
throughout the nation. Every state has some version of an un-
fair and deceptive acts and practices (UDAP) statute.' Though
many of the statutes are very similar, they vary from state to
state." Such variations probably are related more to the local
legislative process than to differing standards of consumer pro-
tection.6
Uniformity in UDAP statutes, however, is not as critical as in
the sale of goods. UDAP statutes do not require multistate sell-
ers and manufacturers to jump through different hoops depend-
ing on the state in which the transaction occurs. These
multistate parties need not research fifty different laws that
might govern their behavior, because they can always choose not
to act unfairly or deceptively. However, in a sales transaction,
these same multistate parties need some certainty as to the
terms of warranties, remedies, disclaimers, and the like. A man-
ufacturer selling its goods nationally will not want to draft fifty
different contracts or warranty documents to deal with the dif-
ferent laws governing consumer transactions in every state.
23. See Frederick H. Miller et al., Introduction to Uniform Commercial Code Annu-
al Survey: The Centennial of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 46 Bus. LAW. 1449, 1451 (1991).
24. SHELDON, supra note 11, §§ 3.4.1.2.3, 3.4.1.2.4.
25. See id., app. A at 527-42 (outlining state UDAP statutes).
26. See id. § 3.4.1.
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Adding provisions to Article 2 acknowledging a distinction
between consumer transactions and purely commercial ones is
not really "consumerism," as suggested by Professor Miller. 7
Rather than stating a jurisdiction's public policy, such new pro-
visions would help define the contract between a consumer and
a commercial party. The policies of fairness and preservation of
the parties' expectations and their real bargain are embodied in
the Code already and all jurisdictions enacting the Code pre-
sumably have agreed on its policies. Addressing consumer issues
in Article 2 is merely a matter of defining how contract law will
work to achieve those policies with regard to consumer transac-
tions. The Article 2 revision process provides an opportunity to
set national standards for sales of goods involving consumers in
a national economy.
To refuse to include consumer provisions in Article 2 today,
based on negative experiences in the past, such as the "limited
success" of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U.C.C.C.) twen-
ty or more years ago,28 is to ignore what has happened since
that time. As Professor Miller points out, the consumer move-
ment has "become a legislative force""9 and consumer law has
"become an accepted concept to modify or supplement commer-
cial law."" Both consumer protection and the economy are very
different now. The strong tradition of consumer protection was
in its infancy at the time of the U.C.C.C.'s enactment.3' The
routine practices of twenty years ago are no longer acceptable,
and more "consumer protection" laws are on the books.
NCCUSL and the ALI should present a Uniform Commercial
Code encompassing all transactions for the sale of goods, includ-
ing nonconsumer transactions, to the state legislatures for enact-
ment. Since the U.C.C.C. was presented to the states twenty
27. See Miller, supra note 1, at 1567, 1572-73.
28. See Fred H. Miller & Ralph J. Rohner, In Search of a Uniform Policy--State
and Federal Services of Consumer Financial Services Law, 37 BUS. LAW. 1415, 1418
(1982).
29. See Miller, supra note 1, at 1570.
30. Id.
31. See Edward Rubin, Efficiency, Equity, and the Proposed Revision of Articles 3
and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 556 n.28 (1991) (pointing to the mid-1960's as the be-
ginning of the consumer movement in the United States).
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years ago, no nonconsumer group with national authority, such
as NCCUSL or the ALI, has made any concerted effort to pass
any legislation designed for consumer transactions. A prediction
that state legislatures could not pass a revised Article 2 contain-
ing special consumer provisions without problems and resulting
nonuniformity therefore is premature." If NCCUSL had tried
recently to pass such legislation and had been unsuccessful, one
might argue for restraint in directly addressing the needs of
consumers in the revision of Article 2. With appointed commis-
sioners representing each state, NCCUSL has political influence
and power in the state legislatures. This power and influence,
along with its credibility and that of the ALI, could give a re-
vised Article 2 containing consumer provisions a strong chance
for success.
The original Code drafters attempted a forward-looking ap-
proach." NCCUSL should use its leadership to do the same
now by taking an affirmative, aggressive approach to adding
appropriate consumer provisions to the revised Article 2. These
additions will be necessary for the Code to reflect the state of
the law and commercial practices not only today but for many
years to come. Those involved in revising Article 2 have recog-
nized that the use of electronic data and the growth of the com-
puter software industry will continue to have a major impact on
commercial practices in the sale of goods.' 4 The drafters also
should recognize that the different nature of consumer transac-
tions warrants a forward-looking approach to the law governing
those transactions. Such an approach could ensure that the
revised Article 2 is not outdated before its presentation for en-
32. Cf Miller, supra note 1, at 1573.
33. See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 183 n.186 (1960)
("[Olpen-ended drafting, with room for courts to move in and readjust over the de-
cades, had been a basic piece of the planning [of the U.C.C.J.").
34. In fact, special committees meet and produce reports and presentations to ad-
vise the Article 2 Drafting Committee. These electronic data and software commit-
tees even have official liaisons to the Drafting Committee. The organizers of the
Drafting Committee apparently have no trouble seeing these areas as subsets of the
larger world of commercial law possibly needing special rules. However, no compara-
ble committee has been charged with studying and reporting on the special problems
of consumer transactions, a more widespread and voluminous subset of commercial
sales.
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actment. Otherwise, the revised Article 2 may be opposed by
consumer groups or legislators concerned about its impact on
their consumer constituents, or met with nonuniform amend-
ments as each state tries to provide consumer rules not included
in the revised Article 2."
Ignoring consumer provisions in the revision of Article 2 will
guarantee nonuniformity, as pointed out by Professor Miller.36
Problems arising with Articles 3 and 4 during their enactment
resulted from the lack of consumer involvement and input in the
drafting process."7 Consumer criticism or opposition, nonuni-
form amendments, a need for further drafting and amendments,
and nonuniformity in final form have characterized the enact-
ment process for these articles. 8 Troublesome nonuniform
amendments were proposed to the articles because of the per-
ceived deficiencies in consumer protection, not because the
states considered them to be too liberal." Not only must a re-
35. The leaders of NCCUSL, ALI, and the Article 2 Drafting Committee must
take an affirmative, perhaps even aggressive, approach to ensure that the final draft
of Article 2 addresses consumer needs. See generally Fred H. Miller, The Uniform
Commercial Code: Will the Experiment Continue?, 43 MERCER L. REV. 799 (1992)
(providing a detailed description of the drafting committee process). These leaders
are to be commended for appointing consumer representatives and practitioners as
official observers in the revision process. The very small number of these representa-
tives, however, reflects the fact that consumer law is practiced mainly by under-
staffed and underfunded nonprofit organizations and a small number of widely dis-
persed private attorneys practicing alone or in very small firms.
The small number of consumer observers to the Drafting Committee is no
match for the representatives of commercial sellers and manufacturers, who are able
to attend the Drafting Committee meetings in large numbers. Although the revision
process has provided an opportunity for full discussion of consumer issues at Draft-
ing Committee meetings, the Committee should continue to ensure that the large
number of commercial representatives, whose clients have superior economic power
sufficient to control the terms of consumer transactions, do not likewise determine
the provisions for consumer contracts for years to come. The leadership of the Draft-
ing Committee is instrumental in leveling the playing field during the drafting pro-
cess, so that in turn the revised Article 2 can level it for consumers.
36. Miller, supra note 1, at 1571-72.
37. See Rubin, supra note 31, at 592 (noting in his conclusion that "the drafting
process of the revisions [of Articles 3 and 4], like that of the original, was dominat-
ed by banking interests").
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Hillebrand, U.C.C. Articles 3 and 4 in the California Legislature: A
New Focus on Consumer Protection in Uniform Law Proposals, 47 CONSUMER FIN.
L.Q. REP. 123, 128 (1993) (discussing California's modifications to Articles 3 and 4).
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vised Article 2 provide fair rules for consumers, but it must also
satisfy the legislators, who will be asked to enact it, that the
article treats their consumer constituents fairly.
IV. THE WRONG WAYS TO GO
Needless to say, the first two approaches that Professor Miller
explored and rejected, to leave Article 2 as it currently stands or
to eliminate any consumer provisions from it and leave the rules
for consumer transactions to other law, 0 would be unsatisfacto-
ry to consumers. Leaving Article 2's treatment of consumers in
its present form does not sufficiently consider the issues exam-
ined above. Professor Miller's second rejected approach, to omit
consumer coverage altogether, does not differ that much from
the first rejected approach, as Article 2 presently contains very
few consumer provisions.4 However, this approach would mean
taking away from consumers the little protection that Article 2
now provides.
The rights and remedies now available to consumers in Article
2, although insufficient, are important and are used currently by
practitioners representing consumers. For example, the provi-
sions for rejection 2 and revocation of acceptance43 codify a be-
lief or assumption in most consumers, though ignorant of any le-
gal basis therefor, that they have a right to return purchased
goods to the merchant. In fact, most retail businesses, either as
a courtesy or as an official policy, will accept returned merchan-
dise without regard to defects, at least for a specified period of
time." After the consumer has taken action based on this as-
sumed right to return, her attorney may use the Article 2 rights
to support the client's assumptions.
The current dearth of consumer provisions in Article 2 has led
courts to fill the gaps with tortured interpretations of Article 2's
40. Miller, supra note 1, at 1571-72.
41. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
42. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1990).
43. Id. § 2-608.
44. Probably due to this practice, some consumers believe that they always have a
right to return goods if they change their mind. For some merchants, such as auto-
mobile dealers, this belief is not true, perhaps due to the nature of the goods. The
revisions may need to address returns not based on defects.
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provisions. In attempts to accommodate consumer cases in which
applying the rules intended for commercial transactions would
be unfair, the courts sometimes fail to distinguish consumer and
commercial cases or to limit application of these decisions. When
these interpretations are argued in subsequent commercial cas-
es, courts may misapply the interpretations, with unfair or unin-
tended results. With better statutory provisions as guidance, the
courts would be less likely to bend the rules in the first instance.
Protections outside of Article 2 for consumer buyers are inade-
quate to counter the incorrect assumptions underlying the Arti-
cle 2 provisions affecting consumer transactions. Most non-Arti-
cle 2 protections at the transaction stage merely regulate credit
terms of the sale and disclosures.45 The FTC Used Car Rule,46
which governs some aspects of the sale of used cars, is mainly a
disclosure rule and does not provide the consumer with a private
right of action.47 Other FTC rules cover only limited aspects of
certain transactions and are mainly disclosure rules as well.48
Consumer advocates would oppose the development of a sepa-
rate consumer law of sales to be completed at some later date.
Under this scenario, either the commercial rules, or the common
law and Restatement, would be applied to consumer transactions
in the meantime. Continued application of existing commercial
law would result in unfairness to the consumer, as previously
45. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988), is a partial
exception. It does regulate some terms of the sale (warranties) and provides for
disclosures. However, the Magnuson-Moss Act is very limited in its application. Its
substantive provisions apply only to express written warranties of a very specific
type, id. § 2304((a), or to implied warranties where such an express written warran-
ty is also given (or where a service contract is involved), id. § 2308. Moreover, many
of its substantive provisions are irrelevant to most consumer sales because these
sales do not provide "full" warranties. See supra note 21.
46. F.T.C. Used Motor Vehicle Trade Regulation Rule (Used Car Rule), 16 C.F.R.
§ 455 (1993).
47. Requirements of the Used Car Rule may be enforceable by a claim under the
state's UDAP statute, depending on whether the statute recognizes violations of the
FTC Act and rules as violations of the state statute's provisions. See SHELDON, su-
pra note 11, at 222 n.567.
48. See, e.g., F.T.C. Credit Practice Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 444.3 (1993); F.T.C. Rule
Concerning Preservation of Consumer's Claims and Defenses (Holder Rule), 16 C.F.R.
§ 433 (1993); F.T.C. Rule Concerning Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 16
C.F.R. § 429 (1993); F.T.C. Mall Order Merchandise Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 435 (1993).
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discussed.49 A reversion to the common law and Restatement
would result in uncertainty both for consumers and for the com-
mercial parties dealing with them. The uncertainty would have
even more impact on the consumers because the fewer number
of bright lines in the law would lead to more litigation. Consum-
ers would be at a severe disadvantage because they do not have
attorneys on retainer and have much less money for litigation,
especially for cases involving a relatively small amount. Con-
sumers and the commercial parties engaging in consumer trans-
actions are entitled to the same certainty in these transactions
as are commercial parties in an entirely commercial transaction.
The revision process for any of the U.C.C. articles is a long
one, taking several years to complete. 0 To create an entirely
new consumer sales code most likely would require an even
more extended period. The same careful thought and expert
study that go into drafting and enacting a uniform commercial
transactions law and the weight of NCCUSL should be available
for consumer transactions. However, NCCUSL and the ALI may
not be as committed to a new consumer sales code and its subse-
quent enactment as they are to revision of the existing U.C.C.
V. SPECIFIC CONSUMER PROVISIONS THAT ARE NECESSARY
A. General Consumer Concerns
In general, Professor Miller's "principled approach" accommo-
dates many of the needs of consumers in revising Article 2. How-
ever, the approach to consumer issues need not be as limited as
he describes. This Section will explore those specific provisions
that are essential for consumers in a revised Article 2. The gen-
eral policies of the Code and Article 2 serve as a backdrop for
these provisions, which would represent a codification of those
general Code policies. These principles need to be stated explicit-
ly for consumer transactions to serve as bright lines and to oth-
erwise eliminate much of the uncertainty leading to litigation.
Their codification would recognize the realities of the current
49. See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
50. See William D. Warren, U.C.C. Drafting Method and Message, 26 LOY. LA. L.
REV. 811, 813-16 (1993).
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national economy in which consumers lack full freedom of con-
tract and equal bargaining power.
Protecting the reasonable expectations of the parties is one of
the overriding policies of the U.C.C.5" Because consumers are
not commercial parties, their expectations and the standards of
reasonableness by which these expectations are judged will vary
drastically from those in many purely commercial transactions.
The provisions offered here also strive to accommodate the Code
policy of preserving the actual bargain of the parties and assur-
ing that this actual bargain prevails over any writing to the
contrary.52 In determining the terms of that bargain and the
consumer's reasonable expectations, the facts and circumstances
surrounding the transaction are relevant." The burden should
be shifted to the commercial party to show that the writing that
it drafted or provided is the parties' real agreement. 4 Taking
these policies into account and injecting consumer provisions
into Article 2 where needed, the Drafting Committee may keep
the courts from torturing the Code to fit consumer fact situa-
tions and thereby creating precedent that later may be applied
inappropriately to commercial cases.
B. Warranties
Article 2 currently contains provisions on how express and
implied warranties are created or arise in the absence of per-
mitted disclaimers.55 However, Article 2 does not provide for
any mandatory, nondisclaimable warranties. In contrast, state
51. See U.C.C. § 1-205 & cmt. 1 (1990).
52. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
53. U.C.C. § 1-201 (3) & cmt. 3 (1990); id. § 2-301 cmt.
54. At the time of this writing, the Drafting Committee has preliminarily agreed
to a new provision in the parol evidence rule of revised Article 2 by which a merger
clause is not conclusive of a determination of intent under § 2-202. U.C.C. § 2-202(b)
(Discussion Draft Dec. 21, 1993). Consumers should applaud this provision as a step
in the right direction. However, this provision was not embraced unanimously and is
subject to change. To completely invalidate merger clauses in consumer contracts, or
at least to place on the seller a burden to prove that the consumer understood and
expressly agreed to the merger clause, would address the problems with consumer
transactions and recognize their economic realities even better.
55. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 to 2-316 (1990) (providing for express and implied war-
ranties and their exclusion or modification).
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lemon laws56 and the federal Magnuson-Moss Act57 do provide
for what can be considered mandatory warranties and for the
terms of those warranties, albeit under limited circumstances."
At a minimum, the revised Article 2 should include those sub-
stantive and remedial 9 provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act
that are relevant to the subjects within the scope of Article 2,
and that are currently the law in spite of contradictory provi-
sions in the current Article 2.60
For example, disclaimers of the implied warranties of mer-
chantability and fitness for a particular purpose should not be
permitted when a warranty that qualifies as a Magnuson-Moss
"written warranty" is given or a service contract is sold within
ninety days of the sale of the goods.6 Any such attempted dis-
claimer or modification should be ineffective.6 2 In addition, Ar-
ticle 2 should account for remedies and other duties that the
Magnuson-Moss Act imposes. Such an accounting could incorpo-
rate explicitly requirements and limitations by reference to those
in the Magnuson-Moss Act.6"
Express warranties can be difficult for the consumer to prove.
While they often are made orally, contracts virtually always
56. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, at app. I (providing a table of all
lemon laws).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988).
58. Id. §§ 2304, 2308.
59. Inclusion in the revised Article 2 of all the disclosure provisions of the
Magnuson-Moss Act seems unnecessary.
60. The difference between Article 2's warranty provisions and those of the
Magnuson-Moss Act currently creates much confusion for consumer transactions re-
garding the actual amount of warranty protection. This confusion occurs because the
Magnuson-Moss Act, when applicable, provides more protection than the official ver-
sion of Article 2 and less protection than some states' variations on the warranty
disclaimer and privity provisions. See Donald F. Clifford, Non-UCC Statutory Provi-
sions Affecting Warranty Disclaimers and Remedies in Sales of Goods, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 1011 (1993). Moreover, the Magnuson-Moss Act preempts any provision of re-
vised Article 2 offering less protection. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2308(c) (1988) (making
ineffective all "disclaimer[s], modification[s], or limitation[s] made in violation of the
Act").
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1988).
62. See id. § 2308(c).
63. However, such a revision need not require resort to a dispute settlement
mechanism, as contained in the Magnuson-Moss Act. This requirement is merely for
suing under the federal statute. Id. § 2310(a)(3). A dispute settlement procedure
should not be required in any other cases under Article 2.
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contain a merger clause and/or a disclaimer of any oral state-
ments by the seller's employees.' Merger clauses thus can be
viewed as defeating the true bargain of the party, in violation of
the underlying policy of preserving it. For this reason, they
should be ineffective in consumer transactions unless the party
seeking to use a merger clause proves that both parties actually
intended its substance. The prevalent use of merger clauses in
consumer transactions, without the buyer's knowledge or agree-
ment, demonstrates that disclosure alone in such transactions is
insufficient.65
Revised Article 2 should clarify that a manufacturer is a seller
in relation to a consumer buyer and that any manufacturer's
warranty is express within section 2-213.66 Furthermore, the
revised Article 2 should not require that an express warranty be
the basis of the bargain or that the consumer buyer rely on it.
Thus, express warranties would include advertisements directed
at the public and manufacturers' warranties that consumers are
not aware of or that are read only after purchase of the goods.
Fairness would seem to require this approach. All consumers
purchasing the goods will pay a price which includes the
manufacturer's calculation of its cost to comply with the warran-
ty extended or advertised standards. However, some consumers
may be unable to prove that they saw the warranty or advertise-
ment let alone relied upon it. Even if they did not see it, they
should receive the same benefit for the same price paid. More-
over, requiring consumers to prove that they saw an express
written warranty or a particular advertisement would unneces-
sarily drive up the cost of litigation for consumers.
C. Disclaimers of Warranties
Disclaimer of implied warranties, especially of the implied
warranty of merchantability, is one of the most important and
64. Jean Braucher, An Informal Resolution Model of Consumer Product Warranty
Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1405, 1414.
65. Professor Miller's suggestion of an affirmative disclosure to the consumer on
the impact of the parol evidence thus would not be effective. See Miller, supra note
1, at 1574-75 n.37.
66. See discussion of privity infra part V.G.
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needed areas of revision in Article 2. Disclaimers are often a
troublesome area in consumer transactions. Disclaimers of war-
ranties in consumer sales transactions are used so frequently
that the absence of disclaimers is conspicuous.e7 Virtually all
consumer sales concluded by written agreement attempt to dis-
claim or limit implied warranties." Article 2 currently allows a
seller to disclaim or modify warranties, but places no limitation
on its ability to do so, unlike the Magnuson-Moss Act.
The notion that a purchased product should be fit for its ordi-
nary purposes, essentially the most common aspect of the war-
ranty of merchantability to apply to consumer transactions, is so
basic that most consumers will assume it, without ever having
heard of the term "merchantability." Allowing merchants and
manufacturers to disclaim the implied warranty of merchant-
ability means allowing a seller to say that it does not promise
that the goods will be fit for their ordinary purposes, most likely
the purpose for which the consumer is buying the goods. In most
cases, if consumers fully understood such a disclaimer, they
probably would not agree to buy something under those terms.
Because most consumers thus truly have not agreed to the dis-
claimer of the warranty of merchantability, the disclaimer in the
form contract is not the true bargain of the parties.
Allowing disclaimers by clauses in contracts or written war-
ranties,69 most of which are the seller's standard forms, further
illustrates how the supposed sufficiency of disclosure is inappli-
67. In fact, the typical clause disclaiming implied warranties often attempts to
disclaim any express warranties as well, contrary to the express language of § 2-
316(1). Debra L. Goetz et al., Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial
Transactions: An Update, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1159, 1258 (1987).
68. When the warranty is only limited in duration and not disclaimed entirely, a
Magnuson-Moss "limited written warranty" generally has been given because the
warrantor by federal law cannot disclaim implied warranties, but is permitted to
limit their duration to the duration of the "limited warranty." 15 U.S.C. § 2308
(1988); see also supra note 22 (discussing limiting the duration of implied warran-
ties).
Although the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is very important
when applicable, because the warranty of merchantability affects all consumer sales
transactions, it is the area in which most problems occur.
69. Those disclaimers in written warranties that the consumer may see only after
the sale are especially invidious and clearly do not indicate the agreement of the
parties at the time of the sale.
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cable to consumer sales transactions." No matter how conspic-
uous the disclaimer,71 if the typical consumer contract is not
read or the consumer has no ability to negotiate different terms,
disclosure of the disclaimer does not suffice and is irrelevant.
Additionally, because typical consumers presumably would not
buy the goods if they believed that there was no assurance of
fitness for their ordinary purpose, 2 disclaimers of the warranty
of merchantability in consumer transactions are not fair.
Prohibiting the disclaimer of warranties of merchantability
would acknowledge the realities of consumer transactions and
would help eliminate the economic inequities in those transac-
tions. A substantial number of states already either prohibit or
restrict such disclaimers.73  Prohibiting such disclaimers
achieves Article 2's policy of fulfilling the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties. The current language of Article 2 would
have to be substantially altered, but the substance would not be
changed. Under the current Article 2, a consumer can assert a
breach of the warranty of merchantability even though the con-
tract contained a form disclosure to which he did not knowingly
agree. However, to prove that no agreement existed would re-
quire substantial litigation and effort. 4 Revising Article 2 to
70. Whether this method is a disclosure at all may be questioned in most cases.
In the typical consumer transaction, a consumer's reading of the entire contract is
either not permitted or discouraged as a practical matter. In many transactions, the
consumer may be unable to read at the level of complexity at which the contract is
written or to read English at all.
71. A written disclaimer must be conspicuous. U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (1990). The ex-
pression "as is," however, may be inserted to exclude all implied warranties, and
need not be conspicuous. See id. § 2-316(3)(a).
72. Some would say that disclaimers of the merchantability warranty should be
allowed because some consumers may want to buy merchandise that is flawed, "ir-
regular," "seconds," or salvage (e.g., a junked car on which to learn auto mechanics).
The response to this argument is easy. By its terms, the warranty of merchantabili-
ty means only that the goods be fit for their ordinary purpose or "pass without
objection in the trade under the contract description." Id. § 2-314(2)(a) & (c). Thus,
"seconds" or "salvage" goods, clearly labeled as such, would have a lower quality as
the expectation for fulfilling the warranty. A similar analysis would apply to used
goods. Eliminating disclaimers of the merchantibility warranty clearly would not
impose some kind of strict liability on all transactions, as Professor Miller suggests.
See Miller, supra note 1, at 1583 n.71.
73. See Clifford, supra note 60, at 1021, 1025-27, 1030-34.
74. Comment 1 to § 1-205 states:
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prohibit merchantability disclaimers explicitly would merely
draw the bright line necessary for consumers. Without a bright
line, litigation is often necessary, and merchants may assert
disclaimers to discourage consumers from pursuing legitimate
claims. Few consumers would realize that they could challenge
the language in a contract.75 Anything less would neglect the
Code's underlying policies and would encourage the continued
use of form disclaimers or boilerplate language in consumer
form contracts drafted in accordance with the lesser standards.
D. Remedies That Work Are Necessary
Although a minimum statutory remedy for damages, which
Professor Miller discusses,76 may be useful in Article 2 and is
certainly appropriate in some other parts of the Code, 77 this
remedy is not a primary goal for consumers in a revised Article
2.78 Rather, the need for some clarification and adjustment of
This Act rejects both the "lay-dictionary" and the "conveyancer's" reading
of a commercial agreement. Instead the meaning of the agreement of the
parties is to be determined by the language used by them and by their
action, read and interpreted in the light of commercial practices and
other surrounding circumstances. The measure and background for inter-
pretation are set by the commercial context, which may explain and
supplement even the language of a formal or final writing.
U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. 1 (1990); see also ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, § 9.2.5.
Of course, to convince a court to throw out the terms of a written contract
completely would take much persuasion and evidence of the circumstances surround-
ing the transaction. In many cases, the evidence may consist of one party's word
against the word of the other. Such proof would require litigation and perhaps more
financial resources than possessed by the average consumer with a merchantability
warranty claim.
75. See supra note 6 (listing U.C.C. sections that provide the agreement should be
interpreted in the context of the surrounding circumstances and intent of the par-
ties).
76. Miller, supra note 1, at 1576-77.
77. Article 9 currently has a remedy for minimum statutory damages in consumer
transactions. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1990). Unlike Article 2, Article 9 gives the commer-
cial party, a creditor, the broad extrajudicial self-help remedy of repossession. Id.
§ 9-502(1).
78. Professor Miller states the concern that minimum statutory damages may be
inflexible and lead to increased litigation, similar to the increase in litigation
brought about by the Truth in Lending Act and the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act. Miller, supra note 1, at 1577 & n.41. This concern is contradicted, however, by
his later acknowledgment that "no known evidence clearly shows that allowing recov-
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Article 2's existing remedies and a commitment to keep other
remedies free of waivers and limitations is more urgent. For ex-
ample, a revised Article 2 should clarify the recoverability of
expenses incurred from financing the sale as consequential dam-
ages." It also should clarify limitations on the ability to restrict
consequential damages contained in section 2-719. Consumers
expect at least a "fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obli-
gations or duties" in the contract.80 This expectation requires
more restrictions on the commercial party's ability to limit the
consumer's remedies for the commercial party's breach than
currently provided in section 2-719.
Section 2-717, which allows the buyer to deduct damages
resulting from a breach from the balance of the price still due,
should be clarified for consumer buyers. This section is useful
ery of at least attorney's fees and costs for consumers in Code actions would prompt
undue litigation." Id. at 1577 n.45. Moreover, the Truth in Lending Act and the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act are not comparable to Article 2. Unlike Article 2, the
Truth in Lending Act is a disclosure statute. Minimum statutory damages are a
necessary deterrent because actual damages resulting from nondisclosure would be
very difficult to prove in most cases.
The federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act is another example that actual
damages can be difficult to prove. The injury caused is often a coercion of the con-
sumer into paying a bill that he may not have paid at that time without the debt
collector's deceptive or unfair actions, perhaps leaving the consumer without the
money to pay a more pressing debt, such as residential rental payments or a se-
cured car loan. Damages of emotional distress for harassment may be difficult to
prove in some circumstances, especially if the consumer did not seek medical atten-
tion or if the harassment did not result in physical symptoms.
Article 2 contains the substantive rules of contract formation, performance, and
remedies. It is not a disclosure statute. As noted by Professor Miller, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, another substantive statute, has generated a different litiga-
tion experience despite its provision for punitive damages. See Miller, supra note 1,
at 1577 & n.44. Moreover, damages for violation of Article 2's requirements or for
breach of the contract generally are included under its damages provisions. U.C.C.
§§ 2-713 to 2-715 (1990).
79. Compare Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. McGlashan, 681 S.W.2d 720 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984) (holding that finance charges could be considered actual damages resulting
from misrepresentation made during the sale of a used car) with Delhomme Indus.,
Inc. v. Houston Beechcraft, Inc., 735 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that finance
charges incurred in the purchase of an airplane were not incident to the seller's
breach and therefore not recoverable as consequential damages). In addition, loss of
use, sales tax, registration fees, repair costs, lost wages, and storage costs clearly
should be included in a consumer's consequential damages.
80. Article 2 currently calls for this remedy. U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (1990).
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for consumers because it allows the consumer buyer to make an
appropriate adjustment in the purchase price without being in
default. It avoids the unfair result of having to pay the full price
after a problem has developed and later sue for damages. What
is not completely clear is whether the installment credit consum-
er buyer can deduct damages from the next installments due or
must wait until the last installment payments are due.s' A sim-
ple clarification in the comments may lessen the chances of a
creditor thrusting the matter into litigation by declaring a de-
fault and repossessing the collateral or beginning a collection
action when a consumer buyer deducts damages from current
installments due under an installment credit contract."
In fashioning remedies that will work for consumer buyers,
the Drafting Committee should recognize the need for an alter-
native to cover." Rarely a practical remedy, cover is often im-
possible for consumers, who may not have the financial resourc-
es to invest in duplicate goods" or whose need for the goods
may be immediate. 5 Rejection and revocation of acceptance are
thus essential for consumer transactions." These tools must
remain easily available. Furthermore, Article 2 must retain its
existing flexibility in allowing very informal notice for those
remedies, and for breach in general. 7 The ability of sellers to
prevent rejection and revocation through a limitation of reme-
dies88 should be eliminated or greatly restricted.
81. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, § 29.3.4.2. This issue may be critical
for installment buyers.
82. The language of U.C.C. § 2-717 and its supporting policies favor allowing an
immediate deduction. See id. § 29.3.4.2.
83. See U.C.C. § 2-712 (1990) (providing that the buyer may purchase goods in
substitution for those due from the seller upon breach of the contract).
84. For example, a consumer may not have the resources to purchase another car.
85. For example, the consumer who buys a new video camera to take on vacation
and discovers, in trying it out, that the product does not work properly may need
an immediate replacement.
86. See U.C.C. § 2-602(a) (1990) (providing that the buyer may reject goods "With-
in a reasonable time after their delivery or tender"); id. § 2-608 (stating the circum-
stances under which a buyer may revoke his acceptance).
87. See id. § 2-607 cmt. 4.
88. Id. § 2-719 (permitting an agreement limiting the buyer's remedy).
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1. Attorney's Fees
At a minimum, attorney's fees and costs should be included as
consumers' remedies under Article 2. This remedy is necessary
to encourage the representation of consumers, who, unlike many
commercial parties, have no in-house counsel or attorneys on
retainer. When claims are relatively small, sometimes less than
the costs of pursuing the claims, retainer fees can make legal
representation prohibitive for consumers. The availability of fees
would encourage attorneys to take consumers' cases without
requiring a retainer up front. Attorneys would have a reasonable
prospect of recovering fees and reimbursement of costs. 9
Awarding attorney's fees also serves a deterrent function. The
risk of doing bad business increases when getting "caught"
means exposure to liability for attorney's fees. Moreover, the
availability of attorney's fees would increase the likelihood of
getting "caught" doing bad business because a consumer who
has suffered damages would be better able to sue for them. As
Professor Miller points out, experience has not demonstrated
that attorney's fees would prompt undue litigation or cause any
deleterious effects, rigidity, or inflexibility."0 The only flexibility
that these fees would decrease is the commercial party's "flexi-
bility" to breach the contract or violate the law. Exposure to
liability for fees and costs also has a tendency to cut down on
litigation and encourage settlement because commercial parties
have less incentive to stall the litigation until the case goes
away. This ability to stall is especially implicated when the com-
mercial party has the resources to continue the litigation while
wearing down the resources of the consumer.
As Professor Miller points out, the contract, prepared by the
commercial party, most likely will provide for attorney's fees and
89. Attorney's fees are important for both consumers ineligible for free legal ser-
vices and those represented by legal services programs. The fees that legal services
programs receive from litigation encourages them to take on cases that might other-
wise be seen as a drain of resources and as low priority or not a priority at all.
Once the case is taken, the potential of cost recovery would allow the attorney,
whether in a private or legal services practice, to pursue the claim zealously, know-
ing that costs, such as those for necessary depositions, can be awarded at the end of
the case.
90. See Miller, supra note 1, at 1577-78 nn.45-46.
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costs of litigation necessary for the seller to enforce the con-
tract.91 The statutory availability of attorney's fees and costs to
a prevailing consumer is another way to level the playing field
between the consumer and commercial parties to the transac-
tion. Because the contract terms in a consumer transaction gen-
erally are not negotiable, statutory provision of fees and costs
recovery will provide the needed balance.
2. The Problems with Alternative Dispute Resolution
One of the major problems with any potential use of alterna-
tive dispute resolution in consumer transactions is the growing
trend to include compulsory arbitration clauses in standard form
contracts.92 Such clauses could, and most likely would, become
a routine part of the boilerplate of consumer contracts, much
like merger clauses and warranty disclaimers are now. Compul-
sory binding arbitration would impact negatively on consumers
in several ways.
One important right that is lost if binding arbitration is re-
quired is the right to a jury trial. In many consumer cases, the
availability of a jury is critical. The potential of a jury trial and
jury verdict are frequently a serious consideration by merchants
and creditors in settling a case before trial. Because juries gen-
erally sympathize with a consumer who has been taken advan-
tage of, access to a jury may be the difference between winning
and losing the case.9" Arbitrators, on the other hand, have gen-
erally been involved in arbitrating nonconsumer commercial dis-
putes and may be unfamiliar with consumer protection provi-
sions or may be more sympathetic to the commercial party in
consumer disputes. If arbitration clauses are buried in the
boilerplate of consumer contracts, the consumer would not be
knowingly giving up the right to a jury trial.
91. Id. at 1576-77 n.40.
92. Portions of this Section are drawn or adapted from a previous work by the
author, Creditors Increasingly Require Arbitration of Consumer Claims, 11 NCLC RE-
PORTS, DECEPTIVE PRACTICES & WARRANTIES EDITION 5 (SeptlOct. 1992).
93. One factor leading to the decisions of the Bank of America and Wells Fargo
Bank, both California banks, to institute an alternative dispute resolution program
was a poll showing that the public harbors a great deal of hostility to banks and
other lenders. Id.
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Another consequence of compulsory binding arbitration can be
the loss of an opportunity to appeal. The arbitration process
provides little or no right to appeal. Moreover, the arbitrator is
not necessarily bound to follow judicial precedent. The arbitrator
also has broad discretion to choose a remedy, and arbitrators
have a tendency to use this discretion to award actual damages
only under basic common law notions. Where attorney's fees are
available for consumers, this tendency often results in failure to
award them.
Very little discovery occurs in an arbitration beyond basic
document production. This lack of discovery is a drawback to
consumers, but not to the merchants and creditors, who will
already have available to them from their own files all of the
information they need to proceed. In addition, this process has
no real format for preliminary motions which may streamline a
case and eliminate extraneous issues. Arbitration proceedings
generally proceed directly to the merits of the claim.
An arbitration may cost much more than an action in court.'
Indigent consumers would be able to file in forma pauperis in
most courts and waive the fees required to bring an action in
that forum. Even if a compulsory arbitration program had a
provision for waiver of fees for indigent consumers, the issue
still would arise as to large fees charged to consumers who may
not quite qualify as indigent yet nevertheless could not afford
the fee.
E. Limitations of Remedies
Comment 1 to section 2-719 currently requires "at least a fair
quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations" under the
contract and states that "it is of the very essence of a sales con-
tract that at least minimum adequate remedies be available."95
This commentary language should be moved into the language of
the statute, at least for consumer transactions. The same limita-
tion placed on liquidated damages by section 2-718(1) should be
placed on any limitations on consumers' remedies. 6 Any limita-
94. An arbitration program required in ITI's standard form loan contracts in-
volved a $750 hearing fee.
95. U.C.C. § 2-719 cmt. 1 (1990).
96. See id. § 2-718 (limiting liquidated damages to that which is reasonable and
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tion of remedies should be "reasonable in the light of the an-
ticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of
proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of other-
wise obtaining an adequate remedy."97
The typical limitation under section 2-719 limits a consumer's
remedies to repair or replacement of the goods.98 In many cas-
es, this remedy is adequate. However, in many other cases it is
not. In some cases, the nature of the goods make repair or re-
placement unacceptable to a consumer under any circumstances.
For instance, it may be important to the consumer to feel that
the goods are truly new and of first qualityY After all, the
amount the consumer has spent on the product likely represents
a larger proportion of the consumer's assets than an individual
purchase would represent for the typical commercial party. In
other cases, the problems that have occurred or the unsuccessful
repair attempts by the seller or manufacturer may have shaken
the consumer's faith in the product or left the consumer with a
feeling that the goods are unsafe.0 0
The consumer should be able to obtain a refund rather than
repair or replacement without having to prove that the limited
remedy failed of its essential purpose, at least after a minimum
number of repair attempts. Again, this rule draws a bright line
that the consumer can use without resort to litigation. Such a
provision has precedent in lemon laws, available in almost every
state to purchasers of new motor vehicles.'0 ' Application of ex-
rendering any unreasonable damages void as a penalty).
97. Id. § 2-718(1).
98. Id. § 2-719(1)(a).
99. For example, this quality may be important to the buyer of a wedding gown,
new car, or computer.
100. A child's safety seat, a parachute, rapelling gear, or a canoe are examples of
goods in which a consumer's shaken faith may be critical. The "shaken faith" doc-
trine was first articulated in Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 240 A.2d 195 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1968) (finding that the purchaser of a new car with a defective transmis-
sion did not have to accept a substitute that contained a transmission of unknown
origin). See also ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, § 31.3.2.
In yet other cases, repair may not be acceptable because the consumer may
have an immediate need for the goods. In such cases, the limited remedy would
seem to fail its essential purpose.
101. See RosMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, app. I.
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isting lemon laws generally is limited to new motor vehicles, 12
and the period during which one can rely upon them is relative-
ly brief."0 3 The underlying concept, however, that at some point
a consumer should be able to demand a replacement or refund
rather than the warrantor's continued repair attempts, is one
upon which consensus appears to have been reached, as Profes-
sor Miller points out.0 4 In addition, potential liability for a re-
fund after a specified number of repair attempts would provide
added incentive for sellers to make effective and timely repairs.
A forward-looking revision process should have little trouble
applying this concept to all consumer transactions to provide a
minimum adequate remedy to consumers.0 5
Any ability to limit remedies in the revised Article 2 should
not prevent the consumer from rejecting or revoking acceptance
of the goods. Prohibiting limitations that deny consumers those
remedies would provide the solution to cases such as those de-
scribed above. Any revocation of acceptance already would be
limited by the current requirement that the breach substantially
impair the value of the goods to the buyer.0 6 Statutory lan-
guage or a comment also could clarify that a subjective
standard, which takes into account the individual buyer's pur-
poses and needs, is to be applied to determine substantial im-
pairment in consumer cases.0 7
The perfect tender rule should remain the standard for rejec-
tion in consumer transactions.0 8 A minor defect in a consumer
product may be sufficient to make it unacceptable to that con-
sumer.'0 9 Because consumers do not have bargaining power
102. A few states also have lemon laws covering used cars. Id. § 34.12.
103. Usually a lemon law claim must be presented within one to two years after
the purchase of the car. See id. § 34.4.
104. See Miller, supra note 1, at 1590.
105. See id& At the very minimum, big ticket items other than motor vehicles, such
as mobile homes, major appliances, boats, recreational vehicles, and electronics
equipment, should be subject to lemon law-type provisions.
Whatever the actual terms of any lemon law-type provisions in the revised
Article 2, the language should make clear that any existing state lemon laws with
more favorable provisions for consumers are not preempted.
106. U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (1990).
107. Id. § 2-608 cmt. 2; see also ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, § 27.3.2.
108. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1990) (providing that the buyer is not obligated to accept
goods that "fail in any respect").
109. For example, a large scratch in the paint on a new car door may be a rep-
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equal to that of commercial parties, they cannot avoid limita-
tions on the right to reject imposed by the commercial parties.
Permiting limitations of the right to reject therefore essentially
abrogates the perfect tender rule. That rule should remain as it
currently is in section 2-601, with the burden on the seller, be-
fore acceptance, to demonstrate that the goods are conform-
ing.110
Another limitation of remedies common to consumer transac-
tions is the exclusion of incidental and consequential damages.
Under the current language of Article 2, "[wlhere circumstances
cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of its essential pur-
pose," all of the remedies in Article 2 are available despite the
limitation."' An issue arises, however, as to the continued
validity of the limitation on incidental and consequential damag-
es."' The majority of courts considering this issue, especially
in consumer cases, have allowed incidental and consequential
damages when the limited remedy fails of its essential pur-
pose."' The language of the revised Article 2 should clarify
that, in consumer cases, incidental and consequential damages
are reinstated whenever the limited remedy is no longer valid.
F. Rejection, Revocation, and Acceptance
Merchants often fail to acknowledge and accept the
consumer's attempts to use the self-help remedies currently
provided in Article 2. Consumers are generally unaware of the
exact nature of the rejection and revocation remedies. They may
believe that they have no choice but to keep the goods and con-
tinue to use them when a merchant refuses to acknowledge their
arable minor defect, but the consumer may not want a new car that starts out with
a door that has been repainted outside of the factory because it may be more sus-
ceptible to rust and the car might have a lower resale value.
110. See, e.g., Latham & Assoc., Inc. v. William Raveis Real Estate, Inc., 589 A.2d
337, 340 (Conn. 1991) (finding that the seller of a defective compter system had the
burden of demonstrating that the defect resulted from the buyer, once the buyer had
shown that the product "failed in any respect"); Flowers Baking Co. v. R-P Pack-
aging, Inc., 329 S.E.2d 462 (Va. 1985) (finding that the seller of wrapping material
had the burden of proving the goods conformed to the contract).
111. U.C.C. § 2-719(2) (1990).
112. See ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, § 32.4.3.
113. See id. at 467 n.62 (citing cases).
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rejection or revocation. Alternatively, consumers faced with such
a response from a seller simply may leave the goods at the
seller's place of business."" They may consult an attorney, if
available, only at a later point and only then become aware of
their rights. To enforce these rights, consumers must resort to
litigation, or in many cases, defend a deficiency action to collect
the alleged debt after repossession of the goods for the
consumer's rightful refusal to pay. Including bright line rules in
the Code for consumer cases would go a long way toward solving
this problem.
Revised Article 2 should clarify that a consumer's use of the
goods after rejection or revocation does not necessarily constitute
acceptance (or reacceptance, in the case of revocation). If the
seller has refused to acknowledge a consumer's rejection or revo-
cation, the consumer's use should never constitute acceptance.
The facts and circumstances of each case must be considered
before use can amount to acceptance. The consumer may have
no choice but to use the goods if they are needed and if the con-
sumer cannot afford to replace the goods because the seller has
not acknowledged rejection and returned the money paid for
them. Use also may be necessary to preserve or protect the
buyer's security interest under section 2-711."' The revision
should clarify that acceptance cannot occur while the seller's
attempt to cure through repair is ongoing. The consumer also
may need sufficient time after the seller has completed its at-
tempted cure to inspect the goods adequately. Adequate inspec-
tion before or after repair attempts itself may require a certain
amount of use to demonstrate defects not immediately apparent.
In any of the above situations, the consumer's justifiable use
of the goods should not entitle the seller to compensation," 6
114. The seller's treatment of the rejection or revocation as a "voluntary" reposses-
sion often further complicates this situation. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (1990) (discussing a
secured seller's right to possession after default).
115. See, e.g., Mobile Home Sales Management, Inc. v. Brown, 562 P.2d 1378 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1977) (finding that the buyers were preserving a mobile home for the bene-
fit of the seller as well as holding it for their own security); Jones v. Abriani, 350
N.E.2d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (finding the continued use of a mobile home was
pursuant to the buyers' security interest and that there was no showing of prejudice
to the seller).
116. For example, if a consumer discovers a flaw in the finish of a wooden dining
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especially when the seller's breach and subsequent refusal or
inability to remedy the situation occasions that use.
G. Privity
As commercial parties, sellers and manufacturers in the dis-
tribution chain can negotiate with each other. They can contract
for the risks of breach and insolvency of any of the parties, the
extent of liability, as well as the nature and extent of any in-
demnification. The consumer is unable to negotiate such allo-
cations of risk and liability and must rely upon Article 2's provi-
sions to provide for fairness and, as Professor Miller points out,
an effective remedy for a defective product."7
Consumers should be able to assert their claims against re-
mote sellers, without being limited by the contract between the
remote seller and its buyer. The remote purchaser or user
should be able to do the same. Because warranty under Article 2
is an obligation imposed by law and not a matter of agreement,
as explained by Professor Miller, privity is not inherent but
rather derives from the case law."' Therefore, one party need
not be in privity with another for the law to impose an obliga-
tion. Section 2-318 on privity should be revised with a view
toward clarifying and expanding the requirements of both verti-
cal and horizontal privity in consumer transactions.
To advance the underlying policies of the Code, a revised
Article 2 thus should eliminate any requirement of privity to
recover for all losses proximately sustained, including both per-
sonal injury and economic loss, in consumer transactions. This
revision should be done explicitly in Article 2 as a matter of
policy, and should not be left to the courts to decide, as Professor
Miller suggests."' Courts may feel constrained both by com-
mon law notions of privity and by the precedential value that
their decisions on privity in consumer cases may have on later
room table after delivery, the consumer's family should not be required to eat all
meals at restaurants while waiting for the seller to replace the table just to avoid
liability to the seller for such use.
117. Miller, supra note 1, at 1566, 1585 & n.81.
118. Id. at 1583 n.72.
119. Id. at 1584.
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commercial cases. The Code is not and should not be merely an
attempt to codify existing law as it has developed. Instead, it
should recognize the realities of commerce and formulate rules
that account for those realities as well as for the needs and
growth of commerce for years to come.
Elimination of the privity requirement for consumer transac-
tions also would accommodate the parties' reasonable expecta-
tions. Manufacturers and sellers placing goods into the stream of
commerce both reasonably expect the goods to end up in the
hands of an individual consumer. Often, the manufacturer itself
makes a warranty to the ultimate consumer. The damages that
may be incurred by any individual, whether the buyer, another
user, or a bystander, due to a breach of warranty in a consumer
transaction, then, would not be out of the realm of their reason-
able expectations. Similarly, a consumer might reasonably ex-
pect the manufacturer to stand behind its product, no matter
who is using it.
Any argument to retain privity usually addresses the possibil-
ity that a remote seller ultimately may be liable for consequen-
tial damages resulting from a breach and may want the certain-
ty of being able to limit this potential. 20 There are two an-
swers to this argument. First, as stated above, the commercial
parties are better able to negotiate terms with one another to
cover any necessary indemnification.'2' Second, as Professor
Miller states: any damages that would not come within the pur-
view of strict liability (not limited by privity) would be "largely
inconsequential" and "certainly... others in the distributive
chain who are better able to bear or spread such losses should
assume them, rather than consumers."22
Revised Article 2 need not limit itself to the scope of the
Magnuson-Moss Act, but should expand beyond Magnuson-Moss
on privity and other issues. Coverage of the Magnuson-Moss Act
is limited to a specific type of "written warranty." 2 Many of
120. See generally ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, § 19.
121. A revised Article 2 could provide for an indemnification claim between the
commercial parties involved as the default rule in the absence of a contract with
contrary terms.
122. Miller, supra note 1, at 1585 n.80.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 2303 (1988). It also applies to the sale of service contracts and to
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its requirements are limited to "full" warranties not commonly
found in consumer cases. 2 4 A revised Article 2 can apply the
principles of Magnuson-Moss to a broader range of situations.
One of these principles is to make any supplier or warrantor
giving a Magnuson-Moss written warranty liable to any consum-
er damaged by a breach of the written warranty or of any im-
plied warranty, without regard to privity. 2 ' Revised Article 2
should apply these principles to all warranties, express and
implied, in consumer sales transactions.
H. Notice
Notice requirements for consumer transactions should be kept
minimal and informal. They should continue to be interpreted
liberally in accordance with the rule that the purpose of notice is
"to defeat commercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith con-
sumer of his remedy.""6 As Professor Miller explains, the poli-
cies behind the requirement for notice either are irrelevant to
consumer transactions or can be accommodated in other
ways." ' The rights of the consumer should not be lost because
of a lack of notification. Most consumers are not aware of the
specific requirements for notice of breach, rejection, revocation,
and deduction of damages from the balance owed. Nevertheless,
they most likely will say or do something to indicate their posi-
tion to their immediate seller or to the manufacturer. A revised
Article 2 should preserve the rule that the notice required of
consumers can be informal, vague, and need not be in writ-
ing.128
A further clarification is needed to state explicitly that notice
may be given to any party, without regard to privity. Consumers
may think that notice to a car dealer, their immediate seller, is
sufficient for breach of the manufacturer's warranty. This as-
sumption is not unreasonable, given that consumers obtain war-
the breach of any implied warranties. See id. §§ 2306, 2308.
124. See supra note 21.
125. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301(3), 2310(d)(1) (1988).
126. U.C.C. § 2-607 cmt. 4 (1990).
127. Miller, supra note 1, at 1587 n.88.
128. U.C.C. § 2-607 cmts. 4, 5 (1990); id. § 2-608 cmts. 4, 5; § 2-717 cmt. 2; see
also ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, §§ 27.2.2.6, 27.3.8, 30.5.
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ranty documents from and deal directly with the dealer. More-
over, the dealer generally displays the manufacturer's name and
logo, is licensed by the manufacturer to sell its cars, and services
the car under the manufacturer's warranty. The very same poli-
cies that permit notice to be informal dictate that notice to any
party in the distribution chain should be sufficient.'29
I. Breach by the Buyer: Sellers' Liquidated and Consequential
Damages
Consumer representatives would agree with Professor Miller
that Article 2 should regulate the freedom of a seller to deter-
mine what constitutes a breach by the buyer and what addition-
al remedies for the seller can be specified in the contract.3
Consumer installment contracts, the most common type of writ-
ten contract in consumer transactions, typically add many other
events considered to be a breach or default of the contract to
those listed in section 2-703. These contracts frequently specify
that, upon default, the debt is accelerated and the entire amount
owed becomes due immediately. Some state laws covering con-
sumer transactions already limit the ability to accelerate for
failure to pay promptly, at least for the first time.' 3'
When a consumer buyer breaches, the seller should not be
entitled to consequential damages. Article 2 currently has no
provision for sellers' consequential damages and none should be
added. The number of times when a consumer buyer's breach
could occasion consequential damages for the seller and the
likelihood that such damages would be substantial are very low.
Allowing such damages would introduce new factual questions
and encourage more costly litigation. In addition, sellers could
allege consequential damages as a matter of course in routine
collection actions, where many of the cases are decided by de-
129. Notice to any party that the consumer is withholding the amount of damages
from the price under § 2-717 should be sufficient as against an assignee of the con-
tract. The assignee of a consumer contract most likely takes the contract subject to
any claims and defenses that the consumer has against the seller, pursuant to the
* F.T.C. Holder Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1993). Moreover, the assignee can negotiate a
repurchase agreement or other type of indemnity with the seller.
130. Miller, supra note 1, at 1586.
131. See, e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.111 (1993).
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fault judgments. Those default judgments are sent to collection
agencies after it is too late to reopen and challenge the judg-
ment. Moreover, if revised Article 2 permits consequential dam-
ages for sellers and does not restrict the seller's ability to limit a
consumer buyer's right to consequential damages, standard form
consumer contracts very probably would contain a provision for
the seller's consequential damages and a limitation on the
buyer's right to receive them from the seller.
Liquidated damages, which are not negotiated in a consumer
contract, should not be available to sellers. Such damages have
no place in a consumer contract, where they can become part of
the boilerplate language in standard form contracts." 2 More-
over, the considerations underlying their need in commercial
contracts are not relevant to consumer transactions. One exam-
ple of a liquidated damages clause in a consumer contract is the
typical vehicle purchase order, which provides that if the buyer
does not complete the purchase, the seller has the right to retain
the buyer's deposit. In most such cases, the vehicle ultimately is
sold to another buyer if the first fails to complete the transaction
and the seller will not incur any out of pocket expenses.
The amount of the deposit, thus, bears no relation to any
injury suffered by the dealer and is merely a penalty borne by
the consumer. Section 2-718(1) currently provides that damages
may be liquidated "but only at an amount which is reasonable in
light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the
difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibil-
ity of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy."3 ' A deposit,
such as that described above, does not meet the current Article 2
requirements for liquidated damages, and in fact would be "[a]
term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages" and would
be "void as a penalty.""4 However, consumers rarely challenge
132. See ABA Task Force, An Appraisal of the March 1, 1990, Preliminary Report
of the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 Study Group, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981,
1240 (1991) ("We suggest that if the Study Group's recommendation is implemented,
an exception should be made for consumer transactions. Otherwise, there is a risk
that consumers will regularly become subjected to penal damages by standardized
contract terms over which they have no real bargaining leverage.").
133. U.C.C. § 2-718 (1) (1990).
134. Id.
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such provisions because of the relatively small amounts involved
(although relatively larger to the consumer than to the seller)
and the necessity of litigation to obtain a refund."5 A complete
prohibition of liquidated damages in consumer transactions by
the revised Article 2 would draw a bright line to prohibit these
damages and avert litigation in most cases.
J. Unconscionability
Currently covering only substantive unconscionability, section
2-302 explicitly should include procedural unconscionability as
well. 36 With no explicit regulation of procedural unconsciona-
bility in Article 2, case law and sources outside of the Code must
be relied upon for authority. Procedural unconscionability ad-
dresses the parties' conduct, as opposed to the substance of the
contract.'37 In consumer transactions, the merchants or other
commercial parties have many opportunities to engage in uncon-
scionable conduct, all of which the Code should regulate. The
Code should reach conduct both prior to and following the time
of contracting, such as inducement to enter the contract 38 and
135. Awarding attorney's fees could be especially helpful in this area both in recov-
ering the consumer's damages and in deterring such liquidated damages provisions
in the first instance.
136. Some courts have considered procedural unconscionability (or the lack thereof)
in determining substantive unconscionability. See, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC
Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 122 (Ct. App. 1982) (requiring proof of both procedural
and substantive unconscionability and suggesting that because the two are tied to-
gether the greater the substantive unconscionability, the less procedural unconsciona-
bility is required to find unconscionability); Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture
Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. 1971) (finding an excessive price claim only one element of
procedural unconscionability); ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, § 40.6; Steven E.
Main, Comment, Unconscionability and the Enforcement of Standardized Contracts in
Commercial Transactions, 16 PAC. L.J. 247, 248 (1984).
137. See ROSIARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, § 40.4.
138. Unconscionable inducement covers a wide range of conduct. See, e.g., Murphy
v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (misrepresentation of contract
terms); Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc., 412 N.W.2d 719 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1987) (using high pressure sales); Industralease Automated & Scientific
Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enterprises, Inc., 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (App. Div. 1977) (slipping
unexpected documents among those the buyer is signing); Olivo v. Bob Turner's Ford
Country, Inc., Civ. No. 91-428JP/RWM (D.N.M. complaint filed May 2, 1991) (alleg-
ing false imprisonment in car dealer's showroom for over four hours, until after
closing, until consumers signed contract); see also Karen Peterson, Couple Sues Albu-
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conduct in connection with the performance and enforcement of
the contract.
Article 2A has such a provision. Section 2A-108(2) provides
that if a court finds that unconscionable conduct either induced
a consumer lease or occurred in the collection of a claim arising
from a lease, the court may grant appropriate relief."' An
analogous provision should be added to a revised section 2-302.
The Code should not assume that unconscionable conduct, either
prior to the contract or in the enforcement of it, is more likely to
occur in consumer lease transactions than in the sale of consum-
er goods. Consumer buyers subjected to unconscionable conduct
should have the same recourse under the law as those whose
contract terms are in themselves unconscionable.
Many courts already examine the seller's conduct for proce-
dural unconscionability."4 ° Both the U.C.C." and a similar
provision in the U.C.C.C.' addressing unconscionable induce-
querque Car Dealer: Salesman Held Them Prisoner Until They Signed Deal, Pair
Says, ALBUQUERQUE J., May 3, 1991.
139. Specifically, the section states:
With respect to a consumer lease, if the court as a matter of law finds
that a lease contract or any clause of a lease contract has been induced
by unconscionable conduct or that unconscionable conduct has occurred in
the collection of a claim arising from a lease contract, the court may
grant appropriate relief.
U.C.C. § 2A-108(2) (1990).
140. See supra note 138 (discussing unconscionable inducement).
141. The official comment to U.C.C. § 2A-108 states in part as follows: "To make a
statement to induce the consumer to lease the goods, in the expectation of invoking
an integration clause in the lease to exclude the statement's admissibility in a sub-
sequent dispute, may be unconscionable." U.C.C. § 2A-108 cmt. (1990).
142. Comment 1 to U.C.C.C. § 5.108 states in part as follows:
[The UCCC unconscionability provision], as does UCC Section 2-302,
provides that a court can refuse to enforce or can adjust an agreement or
part of an agreement that was unconscionable on its face at the time it
was made. However, many. agreements are not in and of themselves
unconscionable according to their terms, but they would never have been
entered into by a consumer if unconscionable means had not been em-
ployed to induce the consumer to agree to the contract. It would be a
frustration of the policy against unconscionable contracts for a creditor to
be able to utilize unconscionable acts or practices to obtain an agreement.
Consequently [§ 5.108(1)] also gives to the court the power to refuse to
enforce an agreement if it finds as a matter of law that it was induced
by unconscionable conduct.
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.108 cmt. 1 (1985) (1974 Act).
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ment state the public policy concerns leading to the adoption of
those sections. These concerns essentially recognize that per-
mitting unconscionable conduct to induce a consumer into an
agreement frustrates the policy against unconscionable con-
tracts.1 43
To say that abusive post-contract collection efforts are ad-
dressed adequately in other laws is no answer. Except in limited
instances, the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act'44 does
not cover a seller or other creditor collecting its own debt. 45
Only twenty-three jurisdictions have state debt collection laws
that would address this situation. 46 The fact that nearly half
the states have laws that would regulate the collection activity
of a seller shows some consensus on the need for regulation of
such conduct.
Section 2-302 sets a high standard for substantive unconscio-
nability.47 Use of that standard alone, without procedural un-
conscionability, to challenge even an outrageously high price for
goods is very difficult. A revised Article 2 should take into
account that many consumers may not know the real value of
the goods or may have no choice but to pay an outrageously high
price. 49 This section or a comment should clarify that, in some
cases, a price term alone may be so high as to be unconsciona-
ble.
143. See also Memorandum from Consumer Advocacy Committee, Legal Services
Section, State Bar of California, to Larry Doyle (Nov. 3, 1993) (available from the
California State Bar).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1988).
145. See id. § 1692a(6).
146. See ROBERT J. HOBBS, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
app. L (2d ed. 1991 & Supp. 1993).
147. Relief is available "[i]f the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made . .. .
U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1990).
148. See ROSALARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, § 40.5.6.
149. This scenario often occurs with low income consumers, especially those living
in inner city areas, whose transportation, lack of sophistication, or other factors may
limit them to shopping in the local stores carrying overpriced low quality merchan-
dise. See DAVID D. TROuIr, CONSUMERS UNION, THE THIN RED LINE 27-30 (1993).
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K Modifications and Waivers
Section 2-209, which deals with waivers and modifications of a
contract, should not permit the use of clauses that require any
modification of the contract to be in writing in consumer trans-
actions. These clauses currently are in widespread use. The
existing section 2-209(2) requires that these "no modification
except in writing" clauses be separately signed. 5 ' As explained
above, a separate signature requirement is insufficient to protect
consumers' reasonable expectations.' 5'
For example, a creditor suddenly may declare a default for a
consumer's late payment, although the creditor has in the past
accepted late payments under an installment credit contract.
The courts have held in such cases that by accepting late pay-
ments, the creditor has modified the contract or has waived its
right to rely on the default provisions of the contract requiring
timely payments. Having done so, it must give the consumer
notice that timely payments henceforth will be required before it
can rely on the self-help remedy of repossession again. 5 ' With
a "no modification except in writing" clause, the creditor can
claim that its acceptance of late payments has not modified the
consumer's agreement to pay promptly because there was no
written modification. Where such a clause exists some courts
have found that there was no waiver or modification.'53 This
scenario leaves the creditor unrestricted in its ability to imme-
diately repossess without any notice to the consumer, who rea-
sonably would expect that the late payment would be accepted
just as the previous ones had been. By prohibiting such clauses
in consumer transactions, the Code will further its policy of
preserving the parties' reasonable expectations.
The revised Article 2 should not require consumers' reliance
on a seller's waiver for that waiver to be effective. This require-
150. U.C.C. § 2-209(2) (1990).
151. See Douglas K. Newell, Cleaning up U.C.C. Section 2-209, 27 IDAHO L. REV.
487, 498 (1990).
152. See, e.g., Margolin v. Franklin, 270 N.E.2d 140 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971); see also
JONATHAN SHELDON & ROBERT A. SABLE, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CTR., REPOSSES-
SIONS § 4.4.2 & n.135 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993).
153. See, e.g., General Grocer Co. v. Bachar, 365 N.E.2d 1106, 1109 (Ill. App. Ct.
1977) (examining commercial case).
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ment would only introduce more factual issues and encourage or
require litigation. Because an individual consumer in a situation
otherwise giving rise to a seller's waiver very probably relied on
the seller's conduct in one way or another, no specific proof re-
quirement should be imposed. The cost of proving reliance in
every case would far outweigh the benefits of requiring proof in
the rare case in which the consumer did not rely at all.
The revised Article 2 also should prohibit the waiver of provi-
sions protecting consumers in their transactions with commer-
cial parties. The inequality in bargaining power and the nature
of adhesion contracts virtually assure that any waiver of a
consumer's rights would not be the true and knowing agreement
of the parties and that the consumer would not have received
some compensation for having waived the rights.' As a mat-
ter of Code policy, these rights should be explicitly nonwaivable
standards rather than merely default rules. The purpose of codi-
fying these rights is to protect the consumers' reasonable expec-
tations and to equalize bargaining power. If commercial parties
can extract waivers from consumers, they destroy the equality
intended and thereby nullify the Code's protections.
L. The Statute of Limitations
As Professor Miller suggests, the statute of limitations in
Article 2 should be based on discovery rather than on the date of
delivery.'55 The types of problems that consumers have with
goods purchased in consumer transactions are more related to
the condition of or title to the goods than to pre-delivery occur-
rences, as may be the case in a purely commercial sale transac-
tion. Breaches relating to the condition of or title to the goods
frequently are based on defects that are not immediately appar-
ent upon delivery, and some may be discovered only after many
years.'56 A consumer limited to bringing claims within four
154. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 95 (N.J. 1960).
155. Miller, supra note 1, at 1582-83.
156. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hammer Holdings, Inc., 850 F.2d 3 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding
that the cause of action accrued at the time of the sale of the fake painting rather
than at the time of the discovery of the forgery); Anderson v. Deere & Co., 622 F.
Supp. 290 (D. Colo. 1985) (holding that the statute of limitations began to run at
the time of the sale of the defective product even though the plaintiffs were not par-
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years of delivery may have just discovered the defect or may not
yet have discovered it by the time the statute of limitations has
run. For example, if any consumer reasonably would expect the
product to last for six years and it instead fails after four years
due to an inherent defect, the consumer is currently without a
remedy. The consequences to the consumer of losing a remedy
can be proportionally greater to the consumer than to a com-
mercial party.
A discovery statute of limitations would not make a seller
liable for defects in the product indefinitely. In determining the
existence of a breach, the reasonable useful life of the product
and the condition of the goods as sold would be relevant. A dis-
covery rule would comport with the Magnuson-Moss notion of a
duration limitation on implied warranties.'57 Such limitations
are prevalent in manufacturers' Magnuson-Moss warranties.
M. Definitions and Scope
For Article 2 to take into account the special needs of consum-
ers, it must distinguish when the rules for consumer transac-
tions are applicable. The most logical way to do so is to create a
definition of "consumer transaction" or "consumer contract,"
currently lacking in the Code. Using "consumer product"53 or
"consumer buyer" can be either too broad or too limited in appli-
cation to particular transactions. The definition of "consumer
transaction" or "consumer contract" should be stated in terms of
the intended use of the goods at the time of the transaction, not
in terms of what the goods are "normally used for."'59 Defining
consumer transactions as those in which the goods are pur-
ties to the sale); Wright v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 358 So. 2d 444, 446 (Ala. 1978)
(holding that the statute began to run at time of delivery of the crane even though
the breach was not discovered until four years after delivery).
157. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (1988) (permitting a
written warranty to limit the duration of implied warranties to the duration of the
express warranty); see also supra note 22.
158. The Magnuson-Moss Act, 15 U.S.C. 2308(1) (1988), uses this term to determine
its applicability. As a result, the Act applies even if a business buys goods consid-
ered to be "consumer products." Use of the same term with a different definition
could confuse the parties to a contract and the courts interpreting it.
159. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (1988) (defining "consumer product" in terms of what the
goods are "normally used for").
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chased "primarily for personal, family or household purposes"
employs those terms commonly used by consumer protection
statutes to distinguish consumer transactions.6 "
VI. CONCLUSION
Very important in practice to consumers, Article 2 is used
extensively both to pursue and to defend claims arsing out of
consumer transactions. 16' Even now, it is not a pristine "com-
mercial-only" law, nor can or should it be. Those involved in
revising the Code must discard any such notion and recognize
that commerce involves consumers. They also must recognize
that the modern national economy needs uniform rules to pro-
vide the framework and certainty to transactions. Times have
changed significantly from when consumer transactions were
essentially local in nature. The revision should take account of
the present nature of this area of commerce and fashion a for-
ward-looking law to serve both sides of consumer transactions
for years to come. If the end product does not sufficiently ad-
dress these needs, however, consumer representatives in every
state will be forced to oppose its enactment at the legislative
level.
160. See, e.g., Truth m Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1988); Consumer Leasing
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667(l) (1988); Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692a(5) (1988); Truth m Lending Act Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(2) (1993);
Truth m Lending Act Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. § 213.2(a)(6) (1993).
161. See, e.g., ROSMARIN & SHELDON, supra note 7, § 9.2.2.
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